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18 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Crisis Management Task Force Meeting, 16 August 1976

1. In attendance were Mr. Bush, Mr. Knoche, [redacted] and the members of the Crisis Management Task Force. George Carver opened the meeting by outlining for Mr. Bush the problem of intelligence support to national decision making in periods of crisis. He stuck closely to the text of the draft which is attached. Following Mr. Carver's presentation, [redacted] opined that this subject really fell within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Community Staff. Mr. Carver explained that the IC Staff was, indeed, represented on this Task Force. The group, however, had not attempted to go beyond Agency organization for periods of crisis in the belief that CIA should have its ducks in a row before attempting to align those of the Community. [redacted] seemed unimpressed.

2. Mr. Knoche suggested that the Agency organization for crisis management could best be addressed by Cord Meyer who will take over leadership of the Task Force from George Carver. Mr. Knoche suggested that, indeed, the DCI's role in wartime was a suitable subject for IC Staff study. Mr. Meyer said that any new administration would probably create new mechanisms and relationships for dealing with crises and that the Task Force could, at this time, realistically hope only to do its homework. Any concrete proposal for bettering crisis management in the Community would have to await the outcome of the election.

3. Mr. Bush indicated that he did feel crisis management was a serious problem. He found it hard to believe that no legislation or regulations exist spelling out the DCI's role in wartime. He asked that the Task Force and the IC Staff work together on this problem. As one observer at the table noted, it does not seem suitable that the DCI's only role in wartime is to be invited to view it on the television.

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4. I seriously doubt that there will be much forward motion on this problem in the immediate future.

[REDACTED]

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Assistant Executive Officer
National Intelligence

Attachment
As stated

cc:

[REDACTED]

Distribution:

- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Crisis Management Task Force File
- 1 - EO/NI
- 1 - AEO/NI
- 1 - D/DCI/NI
- 1 - AEO/NI Chrono
- 1 - RI

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NATIONAL DECISION MAKING
IN PERIODS OF CRISIS

- I. Problem defined
- II. Concept of a four segment continuum: Normalcy, small "c" crisis, large "C" crisis, wartime
 - Commonality of problems of continuum
 - Adjustments to system must flow through the system not be radical revisions of existing mechanisms
 - US behavioral patterns -- thinking as well as operational -- must be fed into the system
 - DOD view of "National Command Authorities"
- III. Normalcy
 - Brief description of the Intelligence Community
 - How it normally operates
 - What is expected of it by the national decision makers
- IV. Small "c" Crisis
 - Changes in intelligence support required -- WSAG, etc.
 - Role of D/DCI/NI and NIOs
 - Role of IC Staff
 - Tasking of analysis/collection/action assets and determination of priorities or resolution of conflicts in priorities
 - Interagency task forces

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- National Situation Reports
- Assuring the military that it will receive intelligence support

V. Large "C" Crisis

- Changes in intelligence support, required -- NSC
- Changes needed in small "c" crisis procedures
- Meeting the needs and protecting the equities of the DOD and major overseas commanders

VI. Wartime

- Changes needed in large "C" crisis procedures
- Changes needed (if any) in peacetime subordination
- Role, mission, and subordination of CIA stations
- Relocation arrangements and planning needed:
 - Key individuals
 - Transportation
 - Communications
 - Records
- Alternate command arrangements (the succession question)

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

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